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Collective decisions are ubiquitous in complex democratic societies.
Elections, referenda, decisions in legislatures, committees, multimem-
ber courts, expert panels, and boards of companies or other organi-
zations are all examples. In such decisions, disagreement is equally ubiq-
uitous. People disagree with each other on many levels. They disagree
not only on what choices should be made but also on why those choices
should be made.
Political theorists have offered different accounts of how collective
decisions should be made under conditions of pluralism and when
such decisions are legitimate. Obviously, different decision problems
may require different decision procedures or different criteria of le-
gitimacy. But, even for a given decision problem, rival accounts of how
to solve the problem, which differ on several dimensions, are usually
on offer. In this article, I focus on one such dimension: the importance
assigned not only to the choices made (the “what” question) but also
to the reasons underlying those choices (the “why” question). This di-
mension can be seen as a spectrum between two extremes: the minimal
liberal account at one end and the comprehensive deliberative account at
the other.
The minimal liberal account emphasizes the “what” question, the
comprehensive deliberative account the “why” question. The minimal
liberal account holds that collective decisions should be made only on
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the colloquium on law, economics,
and politics, New York University Law School, September 2004. I am grateful to the
participants at this colloquium for a challenging and helpful discussion. I especially thank
Steven Brams, Franz Dietrich, John Ferejohn, Lewis Kornhauser, Philip Pettit, and the
editors and referees of Ethics for helpful comments, suggestions, and editorial advice.
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practical actions or policies and that the reasons (or justifications) un-
derlying those decisions should be kept private. The comprehensive
deliberative account, by contrast, stresses the importance of giving rea-
sons for collective decisions, where those reasons should themselves be
collectively decided.
Consider a decision to protect a natural habitat. On the minimal
liberal account, it is sufficient to reach agreement on a protection policy,
without agreeing on the reasons supporting that policy. On the com-
prehensive deliberative account, these reasons should also be publicly
considered and decided. There could be many such reasons, and, de-
spite agreeing that the habitat should be protected, people may still
disagree on whether this should be done for aesthetic, recreational,
economic, religious, or other reasons.
While these two extreme positions are ideal types, several influential
accounts, including variants of Dworkin’s, Pettit’s, Rawls’s, and Sun-
stein’s accounts, can be placed at more intermediate positions between
them, as discussed below. One might also defend a minimal liberal
account (or something similar) for some decision problems while de-
fending a comprehensive deliberative account (or something similar)
for others.
My aim in this article is to compare the minimal liberal and com-
prehensive deliberative accounts on the basis of a formal model devel-
oped in the growing literature on the “discursive dilemma” and “judg-
ment aggregation.”1 This model can represent the two accounts in a
unified framework, albeit in a simplified form. I address several ques-
tions: What is the trade-off between the (minimal liberal) demand for
reaching agreement on outcomes and the (comprehensive deliberative)
demand for reason giving? How large should the “sphere of public
reason” be? When do the decision procedures suggested by the two
accounts agree and when do they conflict? How good are these pro-
cedures at tracking the truth in decisions involving matters of fact? What
1. The “discursive dilemma” was first discussed in a legal context under the name
“doctrinal paradox” by Kornhauser and Sager (1986, 1993, 2004), Kornhauser (1992),
and Chapman (1998). Brennan (2001) and Pettit (2001a), who introduced the name
“discursive dilemma,” reinterpreted the “doctrinal paradox” as a broader problem of
“collective (in)coherence.” Generalizing the “discursive dilemma” by drawing on Arrow’s
(1951) axiomatic approach to social choice theory, List and Pettit (2002, 2004) have
developed a formal model of judgment aggregation and proved a simple impossibility
theorem. Further technical results and generalizations of the model have been obtained
by Pauly and van Hees (2005), Dietrich (2005a, 2005b), List (2003, 2004), Dietrich and
List (2004b, 2005), Pigozzi (2005), Ga¨rdenfors (2005), Nehring and Puppe (2005), and
Dokow and Holzman (2005). Bovens and Rabinowicz (2005) and List (2005) have dis-
cussed the “discursive dilemma” from the perspective of the Condorcet jury theorem.
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strategic incentives do they generate for decision makers? Answers to
these questions allow us to compare the strengths and weaknesses of
the two accounts in relation to different decision problems.
After introducing the two accounts in Section II, I argue in Section
III that they can be associated with different decision procedures—
“conclusion-” and “premise-based” ones—which may generate different
outcomes for the same decision problem: the “discursive dilemma.” In
Section IV, I introduce the concept of the public agenda, and in Section
V, I identify a trade-off between some general demands on collective
decision making and assess how the conclusion- and premise-based pro-
cedures solve the trade-off. Sections VI and VII address, respectively, the
truth-tracking capacities of the two procedures in factual decisions and
the incentives they generate for decision makers. In Section VIII, I
conclude and ask whether the premise- and conclusion-based proce-
dures can be embedded in a unified account of collective decision mak-
ing that constitutes a compromise between the minimal liberal and
comprehensive deliberative extremes.
Although the two ideal-typical accounts discussed here are less sub-
tle than many accounts defended in the literature, a comparison of the
ideal types can still shed light on many characteristics that intermediate
accounts have in common with them.
II. TWO ACCOUNTS OF COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING
The Minimal Liberal Account
The minimal liberal account holds that it is (often) sufficient to make
collective decisions only on specific actions or policies, while leaving
underlying reasons undecided. Inspired by Sunstein (1994), I call such
decisions incompletely theorized ones.2 The minimal liberal account holds
that making collective decisions on more fundamental reasons is (often)
not only unnecessary but also infeasible and undesirable. It is unnec-
essary because such reasons are practically irrelevant once there is
enough agreement on the specific decision made. It is infeasible because
people may fail to reach agreement on such reasons. It is undesirable
because people may find some reasons offensive and divisive, even when
they agree on the resulting decision.
As noted above, a policy to protect a natural habitat may be widely
supported, even when people disagree about why the habitat should be
protected. If it were decided that it should be protected to respect God’s
2. Crucially, Sunstein’s own account of “incompletely theorized agreements” refers
only to judicial decisions; elsewhere Sunstein is a defender of deliberative democracy with
regard to political decisions. Here I use the notion of “incomplete theorization” in a more
general sense than intended by Sunstein so as to apply not only to judicial decisions, but
to any kinds of collective decisions.
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creation, this might offend an atheist environmentalist or someone of
another religion, who would otherwise happily endorse protecting the
habitat. Similarly, the citizens of a liberal state may agree that human
beings have inalienable rights, while disagreeing on where these rights
come from. If the state were to take a particular philosophical stance
on the source of human rights, this might alienate citizens with a dif-
ferent philosophical view, who endorse human rights for different rea-
sons. Also, if there is broad support for human rights, it is unclear what
the state would gain by committing itself to a particular stance on the
source of those rights. In summary, on the minimal liberal account,
incompletely theorized agreements are essential for the functioning of
a pluralistic society, which is characterized by irresolvable disagreements
on “higher-order” reasons.
The Comprehensive Deliberative Account
In contrast to the minimal liberal account, the comprehensive delib-
erative account holds that it is (often) insufficient to make collective
decisions merely on specific actions or policies, without making the
underlying reasons public. The account demands what Pettit (2001b)
calls the “collectivization of reason”: it holds that it is (often) necessary
for democratic legitimacy to supplement collective decisions on actions
or policies with supporting reasons.3 These reasons should themselves
be collectively decided and publicly defensible. On this account, it is
not enough for the legitimacy of an action or policy that the majority
endorses this action or policy. Such majority endorsement might stem
from a spontaneous majority passion or lack any reasoned justification.
The comprehensive deliberative account proposes two demands to
prevent majority tyranny or unreasoned majority decisions and to en-
hance democratic legitimacy. First, collective decisions should be sup-
ported by publicly decided reasons; second, the overall system of col-
lectively decided reasons and outcomes should be coherent. I call the
first the conversability demand and the second the integrity demand, inspired
by Pettit (2001a) and Dworkin (1986), respectively.4 An agent is con-
versable if she can justify her actions by giving appropriate reasons for
3. Pettit’s precise understanding of the collectivization of reason goes further; he
thinks of a group as collectivizing reason when it holds itself as a collectivity to the demands
of reason.
4. On “conversability,” see also Pettit and Smith (1996). Dworkin’s account of “in-
tegrity” concerns judicial interpretation rather than collective decision making more gen-
erally. Here I use the notion of “integrity” in a more general sense than intended by
Dworkin.
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these actions. An agent displays integrity if she is coherent in her judg-
ments or decisions across multiple issues and/or across time.5
It is a familiar requirement that individual agents should be con-
versable and display integrity in this way. To defend their actions when
challenged, individuals are usually expected to give reasons for these
actions: they are expected to be conversable. Likewise, individuals are
usually expected to be rational, which requires coherence of their sys-
tems of judgments or decisions: a demand of integrity. The compre-
hensive deliberative account extends these requirements to groups.
Comparing the Two Accounts
The minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts view the
relation between reason giving and the stability and legitimacy of col-
lective decisions very differently. One sees reason giving as unnecessary
for, and potentially threatening to, stability and legitimacy, the other as
conducive to, and potentially necessary for, it. To make a collective
decision stable and legitimate, on the minimal liberal account, the de-
cision must be as neutral as possible between different supporting rea-
sons, as there may be irresolvable disagreements on such reasons. On
the comprehensive deliberative account, by contrast, the decision must
be supported by appropriate reasons, which are also collectively decided
and publicly defensible.
The minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts are
simplified ideals, but several accounts in the literature—or variants of
such accounts—can be placed at intermediate positions between them.
At the risk of oversimplification, here are some examples. With regard
to judicial decisions, Sunstein’s account of “incompletely theorized
agreements” (1994) is closer to the minimal liberal end of the spectrum,
while Dworkin’s account of “integrity” in law (1986) is closer to the
comprehensive deliberative end. With regard to political decisions,
Riker’s “liberalism” (as opposed to “populism”) (1982) is closer to the
minimal liberal end, while many accounts of deliberative democracy,
like Pettit’s proposals on the “collectivization of reason” (2001b), are
closer to the comprehensive deliberative end. Rawls’s “political liber-
alism” (1993) is an important compromise position, on which I make
5. Kornhauser and Sager (2004) suggest a taxonomy of integrity constraints. First, an
integrity constraint may be applied to the (1a) political or (1b) judicial realms. Second,
it may be applied (2a) only to actions or outcomes or (2b) also to supporting reasons and
justifications. Third, it may be applied (3a) synchronically or (3b) diachronically. Korn-
hauser and Sager argue that Pettit’s and Dworkin’s accounts of conversability or integrity
occupy opposite positions on this taxonomy, claiming that Pettit is mainly concerned with
1a-2b-3a and Dworkin with 1b-2a-3b. But this is not entirely correct, as Pettit also emphasizes
diachronic generalizations of the discursive dilemma and argues that the dilemma occurs
in several realms.
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some remarks below. Of course, the ideal-typical accounts discussed here
miss out on many aspects and nuances of the actual accounts held by
these authors, but a comparison of the ideals still sheds light on those
characteristics that actually held accounts share with them.
The difference between the minimal liberal and comprehensive
deliberative accounts might seem to lie only in whether or not the
reasons behind a collective decision are made public, but not in what
the outcome of the decision is. If this were correct, then the choice
between the two accounts would perhaps affect people’s perception of
a collective decision—especially the perceived legitimacy, which might
be influenced by the public reasons for the decision—but it would not
affect the decision made. But I argue that the two accounts suggest the
use of two different decision procedures that may lead to different
outcomes even for the same decision problem.
III. THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA
Examples
The tenure example.—A university committee has to decide whether to
give tenure to a junior academic (the outcome or conclusion). The re-
quirement for tenure is excellence in both teaching and research (the
two reasons or premises). The first among three committee members
thinks the candidate is excellent in teaching but not in research; the
second thinks she is excellent in research but not in teaching; the third
thinks she is excellent in both. So a majority considers the candidate
excellent in teaching, a majority considers her excellent in research,
but only a minority—the third committee member—thinks the candi-
date should be given tenure. How should the committee decide?6
The global warming example.—An expert policy advisory committee
has to judge whether, given present greenhouse gas emissions, there
will be significant global warming (the conclusion). The experts con-
sider two propositions: first, that greenhouse gas emissions are above
some critical threshold (the first premise); and second, that, if green-
house gas emissions are above the given threshold, then there will be
significant global warming (the second premise). The two propositions
jointly entail that there will be significant global warming. The first
among three experts thinks both propositions are true; the second
thinks the first but not the second is true; the third thinks the second
but not the first is true. So a majority considers each proposition true,
yet a majority believes there will not be significant global warming. What
advice should the committee give?7
6. This example is given in Bovens and Rabinowicz (2005).
7. This example is given in Dietrich and List (2005); for a related example, see
Kornhauser and Sager (2004).
368 Ethics January 2006
The habitat protection example.—A legislature has to decide whether
to protect a natural habitat as a national park. There are many possible
reasons for protecting the habitat. Aesthetic reasons: it is a place of great
natural beauty. Ecological reasons: its biodiversity is unique. Religious
reasons: it is a place of religious significance. Economic reasons: it at-
tracts ecotourists. Scientific reasons: it provides records of evolutionary
processes. Medical reasons: its flora and fauna provide ingredients for
new drugs. Political reasons: protecting the habitat boosts the country’s
reputation as being environmentally friendly. And so on. Each possible
reason might serve as a sufficient premise to support the conclusion to
protect the habitat. The protection of the habitat is unanimously sup-
ported by the legislators. But the legislature might also seek to agree
on a declaration as to why the habitat should be protected. Every pro-
posed wording is rejected by a majority. How should the legislators
proceed?
Each of these decision problems involves reasons and outcomes or
premises and conclusions. In the first two examples, the relation be-
tween premises and conclusion is conjunctive : accepting all premises is
necessary and sufficient for accepting the conclusion. In the third ex-
ample, it is disjunctive : accepting at least one premise is sufficient (and
necessary, if the premises are exhaustive) for accepting the conclusion.
Let R1, R2, . . . , Rk denote the premises and C the conclusion. In a
conjunctive decision problem, the relation between premises and conclusion
is given by the proposition ; in a disjunctiveC ↔ (R & R & . . . & R )1 2 k
decision problem, by .8C ↔ (R or R or . . . or R )1 2 k
Two Decision Procedures
As the minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts assign
different roles to reasons as opposed to outcomes in collective decisions,
they also suggest different procedures for solving conjunctive and dis-
junctive decision problems. On the minimal liberal account, all that is
required in each case is a decision on the conclusion. This suggests the
use of the conclusion-based decision procedure.
The conclusion-based procedure.—The group makes a collective judg-
ment on the conclusion (C) by taking a majority vote on that conclusion.
8. The first and third examples are direct instances of these conjunctive and disjunctive
forms. The second example can be interpreted as an instance of the conjunctive form
but also allows an alternative representation. The two premises can be written as P and
, and the conclusion as Q; now the precise logical structure of the problem dependsP r Q
on the interpretation of the conditional r. For simplicity, I focus on conjunctive and
disjunctive decision problems here. The model of judgment aggregation developed in List
and Pettit (2002, 2004) and subsequent papers permits any logical relations expressible
in logic.
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The group abstains from making any collective judgments on the prem-
ises (R1, R2, . . . , Rk).
In this way, judgments on the premises remain private. They influ-
ence the collective judgment on the conclusion at most indirectly,
through their influence on the individuals’ judgments on that conclu-
sion. On the comprehensive deliberative account, by contrast, a decision
on the conclusion is not enough. Rather, the decision has to be sup-
ported by appropriate reasons, which are themselves publicly decided.
This suggests the use of the premise-based decision procedure.
The premise-based procedure.—The group first makes collective judg-
ments on all premises (R1, R2, . . . , Rk) by taking a majority vote on
each premise. The group then derives its collective judgment on the
conclusion (C) from these collective judgments on the premises, using
the appropriate logical relation.9
In this way, the logical reasoning from the premises to the conclu-
sion is performed at the collective level; the collective judgment on the
conclusion is thus consistent with, and supported by, collective judg-
ments on the premises.
The premise- and conclusion-based procedures clearly differ in
whether or not any collective judgments are made on the premises, but
they may also differ in the collective judgment they generate on the
conclusion, as shown next. This problem has become known as the
“doctrinal paradox” (Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993) or “discursive
dilemma” (Pettit 2001a) and has sparked a technical literature on judg-
ment aggregation (List and Pettit [2002] and other contributions re-
viewed above).
Disagreements between the Premise- and Conclusion-Based Procedures
Consider the tenure and global warming examples. Both are conjunctive
decision problems with premises R1 and R2 and conclusion C. The in-
dividual judgments are as shown in table 1. All individuals have consis-
tent judgments relative to the logical relation .C ↔ (R & R )1 2
Under the conclusion-based procedure, the group takes a majority
vote on C: here C is rejected. Under the premise-based procedure, the
group takes majority votes on R1 and R2, which are both accepted, and
deduces its collective judgment on C from its judgments on R1 and R2,
using the logical relation ; here C is accepted. So theC ↔ (R & R )1 2
premise- and conclusion-based procedures produce different outcomes
on C. In the tenure example, the candidate would be granted tenure
under the premise-based procedure but not under the conclusion-based
one. In the global warming example, the expert committee would advise
9. in a conjunctive problem;C↔ (R & R & . . . & R ) C↔ (R or R or . . . or1 2 k 1 2
in a disjunctive one.R )k
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TABLE 1
The Discursive Dilemma (Conjunctive Form)
R1 R2 C ↔ (R1 & R2) C
Individual 1 True True True True
Individual 2 True False True False
Individual 3 False True True False
Majority True True True False
TABLE 2
The Discursive Dilemma (Disjunctive Form)
R1 R2 R3 C ↔ (R1 or R2 or R3) C
Individual 1 True False False True True
Individual 2 False True False True True
Individual 3 False False True True True
Majority False False False True True
that there will be significant global warming if it uses the premise-based
procedure but not if it uses the conclusion-based one.
Next consider the habitat example. Let C be the proposition to
protect the habitat, and R1, R2, and R3 the propositions that this should
be done, respectively, for scientific, religious, and economic reasons.
For simplicity, suppose that these are the only relevant reasons and that
there are three legislators (or equal-sized factions) with individual judg-
ments as shown in table 2. All individuals have consistent judgments
relative to the logical relation .C ↔ (R or R or R )1 2 3
Under the conclusion-based procedure, the group takes a majority
vote on C: here C is (unanimously) accepted. Under the premise-based
procedure, the group takes majority votes on R1, R2, and R3, which are
each rejected; every proposed reason for protecting the habitat is re-
jected by a majority. The collective judgment on C is then deduced from
these judgments on R1, R2, and R3, using the logical relation C ↔ (R1
; here C is rejected. Again, the premise- and conclusion-or R or R )2 3
based procedures differ in the outcome on C. So the habitat protection
policy would be adopted under the conclusion-based procedure but not
under the premise-based one.
The Frequency of Disagreements between the Conclusion- and Premise-Based
Procedures
Are the disagreements between the premise- and conclusion-based pro-
cedures contrived artifacts, or are they likely to occur in practice? To
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give a partial answer to this question, let me suggest some considerations
on the frequency of such disagreements.
A scenario of likely disagreements.—In a disjunctive decision problem,
suppose each individual has a small but not very small probability p of
accepting each premise.10 Specifically, p is between 0.29 and 0.5 if there
are two premises, between 0.21 and 0.5 if there are three, and between
0.16 and 0.5 if there are four, generally between and 0.5. Ink1 0.5
the habitat example, each proposed reason for protecting the habitat
may appeal to a randomly selected individual only with a low, but not
very low, probability. Then, with increasing group size, the probability
of a disagreement between the premise- and conclusion-based proce-
dures approaches 1. This result holds because, with increasing group
size, the probability of a majority on the conclusion approaches 1 (as
each individual jointly rejects all premises with a probability less than
, that is, accepts at least one premise with a probabilityk(1 p) ! 0.5
greater than 0.5), while the probability of a majority against every prem-
ise also approaches 1. A similar result holds in a conjunctive decision
problem if each individual has a large but not very large probability p
of accepting each premise, specifically between 0.5 and 0.71 if there are
two premises, between 0.5 and 0.79 if there are three, and between 0.5
and 0.84 if there are four, generally between 0.5 and .k0.5
A scenario of unlikely disagreements.—In a disjunctive decision prob-
lem, suppose at least one premise is more likely than not to be accepted
by each individual. For example, one premise might stand out as ap-
pealing. Then, with increasing group size, the probability of a disagree-
ment between the premise- and conclusion-based procedures ap-
proaches 0. This result holds because, with increasing group size, the
probability that at least one premise is accepted by a majority (and
therefore that the conclusion is accepted under both procedures) ap-
proaches 1. A similar result holds in a conjunctive decision problem if
at least one premise is more likely than not to be rejected by each
individual.
The counting and expectation approaches.—To quantify the frequency
of a given voting paradox, social choice theorists often ask the following
two questions. First, given all possible combinations of inputs (here:
individual judgments) from a group of individuals, how large is the
proportion among those combinations leading to the paradox in ques-
tion? Call this the counting approach.11 Second, suppose we do not know
the probability with which each group member endorses each possible
10. In this and the next scenario, I assume that the judgments of different individuals
are mutually independent; also, by saying x is between y and z, I mean .y ! x ! z
11. This approach can be shown to be equivalent to the so-called impartial culture
approach.
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input and we consider every possible probability distribution equally
conceivable;12 then, what is the expected frequency of the paradox in
question? Call this the expectation approach.13 Although answers to these
questions are well known for standard voting paradoxes (Gehrlein and
Fishburn 1976; Gehrlein 1981, 1983), they have only recently been given
for the discursive dilemma, specifically for a disagreement between the
premise- and conclusion-based procedures in a two-premise conjunctive
decision problem; the answers for a two-premise disjunctive decision
problem are the same (List 2005). On the counting approach, the fre-
quency of a disagreement between the two procedures approaches 0.25
with increasing group size; on the expectation approach, it approaches
0.125. Compare this with the frequency of a Condorcet voting cycle over
three candidates.14 On the counting approach, that frequency ap-
proaches 0.08774 with increasing group size; on the expectation ap-
proach, it approaches 0.0625. Both numbers are smaller than those for
disagreements between the premise- and conclusion-based procedures.
Although these results do not prove that such disagreements—discursive
dilemmas—are empirically likely, they underline that they should be
taken as seriously as standard voting paradoxes.
IV. THE PUBLIC AGENDA
The Concept of the Public Agenda
For any given collective decision problem, let the public agenda be the
set of propositions to be collectively decided. The public agenda might
be interpreted as the “sphere of public reason” for that decision
problem.
The minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts can
be seen as alternative views on how large or small the public agenda
should be. The minimal liberal account recommends a small public
agenda: it should include only those propositions on which a decision
is needed for practical action. In the habitat protection example, it
might include only the proposition to protect the habitat but no sup-
porting reasons or background considerations. The comprehensive de-
liberative account recommends a larger public agenda: it should include
not only practical propositions but also relevant supporting reasons and
12. Note that this is a second-order uncertainty. We do not know the judgments that
will be made (a first-order uncertainty), and we do not know the probability distribution
over all possible combinations of judgments (a second-order uncertainty). We apply an
epistemological indifference principle at this second-order level and assume each possible
probability distribution to be equally likely to be correct.
13. This approach can be shown to be equivalent to the so-called impartial anonymous
culture approach.
14. This comparison is arguably appropriate, as a two-premise conjunctive discursive
dilemma is structurally similar to a three-candidate Condorcet paradox (List 2005).
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background considerations. In the habitat case, it might include not
only the proposition to protect the habitat but also other consider-
ations—perhaps economic, political, scientific, or cultural ones—rele-
vant to that main practical issue.
The minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts rep-
resent extreme positions on how to specify the public agenda. On an
intermediate account, some reasons and background considerations
might be deemed publicly admissible, others not; accordingly, the public
agenda might include the former but not the latter. Rawls’s “political
liberalism” (1993), for example, recommends the inclusion of certain
reasons and background considerations in the public agenda and the
exclusion of others. Those to be included are “political” ones that may
be supported by an overlapping consensus in society; those to be ex-
cluded are “metaphysical” ones, on which there may be irresolvable
disagreement and which do not require public resolution.15
The Public Agenda in a Conjunctive or Disjunctive Decision Problem
Consider a conjunctive or disjunctive decision problem. Suppose the
conclusion C is the only practical issue, while the premises
are supporting reasons or theoretical considerations.R , R , . . . , R1 2 k
Then the minimal liberal account would include in the public agenda
only proposition C, while the comprehensive deliberative account would
also include propositions R1, R2, . . . , Rk and a proposition on the
logical relation between the premises and the conclusion, such as
or —or moreC ↔ (R & R & . . . & R ) C ↔ (R or R or . . . or R )1 2 k 1 2 k
than one such proposition if the logical relation itself is under debate.
Further, I assume that, when a proposition is included in the public
agenda, so is its negation; thus the group can accept either the prop-
osition or its negation or neither.
The Complexity of the Public Agenda
Let me call the public agenda simple if it includes only a single “atomic”
proposition such as C (or multiple unconnected ones)16 and nonsimple
if it includes two or more “atomic” propositions such as R1, R2, and C
and at least one “compound” proposition such as orR & R C ↔1 2
for representing logical relations between other proposi-(R & R )1 2
15. An important aspect of Rawls’s “political liberalism” not captured by my analysis
is Rawls’s distinction between decisions concerning the basic structure of society and other
decisions.
16. And its (their) negation(s).
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tions.17 The minimal liberal account usually recommends a simple public
agenda, the comprehensive deliberative account a nonsimple one. It is
important to emphasize that, generally, the members of a group may
disagree not only on premises or conclusions but also on logical rela-
tions.
V. JUDGMENT AGGREGATION: A FORMAL MODEL
The Discursive Dilemma Generalized
Suppose the public agenda has been specified, that is, the propositions
to be decided are given. Then the group needs to find a procedure for
making those decisions. Let a decision procedure be a method of gener-
ating collective judgments on the propositions in the public agenda
based on the group members’ individual judgments on these proposi-
tions.18 Although I have already introduced two such procedures, that
is, the premise- and conclusion-based ones, let me take a step back and
ask what demands one might impose on a decision procedure. At least
three demands seem plausible.
First, the decision procedure should function under conditions of
pluralism. Second, the collective judgments generated by the procedure
should be responsive to the group members’ individual judgments.
Third, the collective judgments should display at least some degree of
integrity. Unlike the first two demands, the third demand might initially
appeal only to proponents of the comprehensive deliberative account.
But the integrity demand as stated here is consistent with the minimal
liberal account, as it has no force when the public agenda is simple: if
17. Crucially, logical interconnections between propositions are not taken to be ex-
ogenously given. Rather, collective judgments can be made on both “atomic” and “com-
pound” propositions. Technically, an agenda is nonsimple if it is of one of the following
forms (or a superset thereof): (i) it includes premises R1, . . . , Rk and either theirk 1 1
conjunction R1 & . . . & Rk, or their disjunction R1 or R2 or . . . or Rk, or both (and the
negations of all these propositions); (ii) it includes premises R1, . . . , Rk, a conclusionk 1 1
C and either the proposition or the propositionC↔ (R & . . . & R ) C↔ (R or R1 k 1 2
or both (and negations); (iii) it includes a premise R, a conclusion C, andor . . . or R )k
the proposition (and negations). The property nonsimple is slightly more de-R r C
manding than that of being not simple. For generalizations of the property nonsimple
under which proposition 2 below continues to hold, see Dietrich (2005b) and Dietrich
and List (2005).
18. A decision procedure is a function whose input is a vector of individual judgment
sets and whose output is a collective judgment set (List and Pettit 2002). An individual
or collective judgment set is a subset of the public agenda interpreted as the set of prop-
ositions accepted (as true) by the individual or collective. Individual judgment sets are
usually assumed to be complete (a member of each proposition-negation pair is accepted)
and consistent (in the standard sense of logic), but these assumptions can be relaxed. In
the collective case, completeness (decisiveness) and consistency (integrity) are introduced
as demands on decision procedures.
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the group considers only a single proposition or several unconnected
ones, then integrity is vacuously satisfied, no matter how the group
decides. Consider the following as a first formalization of the three
demands.
Pluralism.—The decision procedure accepts as admissible inputs all
possible combinations of individual judgments on the propositions in
the public agenda.
Majoritarian responsiveness.—The collective judgment on each prop-
osition in the public agenda is the judgment of the majority of individ-
uals on that proposition.
Integrity.—The collective judgments generated by the decision pro-
cedure are consistent, that is, the propositions collectively accepted can
be simultaneously true.
While the formalizations of the pluralism and integrity demands
are fairly straightforward, majoritarian responsiveness captures only one
form of responsiveness and is generalized and relaxed below. My reason
for considering it as an initial formalization of responsiveness is that it
is the form of responsiveness invoked in discussions of the discursive
dilemma. Are there any decision procedures that simultaneously meet
the three demands in the present form? If the public agenda is non-
simple, as in standard conjunctive or disjunctive decision problems, the
answer is negative.
Proposition 1: For a nonsimple public agenda, there exists no
decision procedure that meets the demands of pluralism, major-
itarian responsiveness, and integrity.19
To sketch a proof, assume, for a contradiction, that there exists a
decision procedure satisfying pluralism, majoritarian responsiveness,
and integrity. For any group of three or more individuals, combinations
of individual judgments similar to those in tables 1 and 2 can be con-
structed; an explicit construction is given in the appendix. By the de-
mand of pluralism, those combinations are admissible inputs to the
decision procedure. By the demand of majoritarian responsiveness, the
collective judgment on each proposition is the majority judgment on
that proposition. But, for the given combinations of individual judg-
ments, those majority judgments are not consistent: the accepted prop-
ositions—for example, R1, R2, , and not-C in table 1—C ↔ (R & R )1 2
cannot be simultaneously true. This contradicts the integrity demand.
19. Assuming three or more individuals. For exactly four individuals, note the remark
after table A3. A variant of the proposition holds whenever the largest minimal inconsistent
subset of the public agenda has three or more elements.
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A More General Impossibility Result
I now keep the formalizations of the pluralism and integrity demands
but generalize that of the responsiveness demand. To give an alternative
formalization of responsiveness without the majoritarian requirement,
define a single-proposition decision rule to be a method of summarizing
the individual judgments on a single proposition into a collective judg-
ment on that proposition. Examples are not only simple majority voting
but also qualified majority voting, submajority voting, the unanimity
rule, a dictatorship of one individual, or even quirkier rules that decide
a proposition based on whether it is supported by an even or odd
number of individuals.
Systematic responsiveness.—There exists a single-proposition decision
rule such that the collective judgment on each proposition in the public
agenda is the result of applying that decision rule to the individual
judgments on that proposition.
Although weaker than majoritarian responsiveness, systematic re-
sponsiveness is still a strong requirement, as it demands independent
and equal treatment of all propositions. Below I consider cases where
we may have good reasons to abandon the requirement of independent
and equal treatment across propositions and thus to relax systematic
responsiveness. In addition to replacing majoritarian responsiveness
with systematic responsiveness here, let me also make explicit two de-
mands implicit in majoritarian responsiveness: first, the decision pro-
cedure should give all individuals equal weight, and second, the pro-
cedure should not leave any propositions in the public agenda
undecided (after all, those propositions are precisely the ones to be
decided):20
Anonymity.—The decision procedure is invariant under permuta-
tions of the individuals.
Decisiveness.—The decision procedure generates a determinate col-
lective judgment on every proposition in the public agenda (acceptance
of either the proposition or its negation).
Again, for a nonsimple public agenda, there exists no decision
procedure that meets all demands simultaneously, as proved by List and
Pettit (2002).
Proposition 2: For a nonsimple public agenda, there exists no
decision procedure that meets the demands of pluralism, system-
atic responsiveness, anonymity, decisiveness, and integrity.21
20. These demands are implicit in majoritarian responsiveness. All individuals have
equal weight in majority decisions, and majority decisions (almost) always lead to a de-
terminate judgment (except for majority ties).
21. Again, assuming three or more individuals.
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This impossibility result is analogous, but not equivalent, to Arrow’s
impossibility theorem (1951) (for a comparison, see List and Pettit 2004;
Dietrich and List 2005). If the public agenda is not only nonsimple but
includes more complex logical interconnections (which can be tech-
nically described), then an impossibility result still occurs if systematic
responsiveness is weakened to independence,22 but respect for unanimity23
is demanded (Pauly and van Hees 2005; Dietrich 2005a; Dietrich and
List 2005; for further results, see the references in n. 1 above).
Escape Routes
Propositions 1 and 2 show that some plausible demands on a decision
procedure are mutually incompatible when the public agenda is non-
simple. As the comprehensive deliberative account typically recom-
mends a nonsimple public agenda, the results pose a challenge for that
account. If the account requires all the identified demands, then it faces
an impossibility problem, as the demands cannot be simultaneously met.
For the minimal liberal account, the problem is less serious, as that
account requires only a simple public agenda. How can the impossibility
problem be avoided? Logically, there are several escape routes (List and
Pettit 2002), but only some are appealing from minimal liberal or com-
prehensive deliberative perspectives.
Shrinking the public agenda.—If the public agenda is simple—con-
taining only a single proposition or multiple unconnected ones—then
the group can take majority votes on those (few) propositions in the
public agenda and will meet all the demands introduced above. This
decision procedure is precisely the conclusion-based procedure in case
the premises in a conjunctive or disjunctive decision problem are ex-
cluded from the public agenda, as recommended by the minimal liberal
account. So the present way to avoid the impossibility problem is the
preferred one from a minimal liberal perspective.
Reducing pluralism, especially through deliberation.—If not all possible
combinations of individual judgments are admissible as inputs to the
decision procedure, but only ones with sufficient agreement among
individuals, then the group can take majority votes on all propositions
in the public agenda—even a nonsimple one—and will meet all the
demands imposed above, except that of pluralism. For a certain type
of structural agreement among individuals, called unidimensional align-
22. Independence is the demand that, for each proposition in the public agenda,
there exists a single-proposition decision rule such that the collective judgment on that
proposition is the result of applying that decision rule to the individual judgments on
that proposition. (Unlike systematic responsiveness, independence allows the single-
proposition decision rule to vary from proposition to proposition.)
23. Defined below in Sec. VII under “An Impossibility Result.”
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ment, majoritarian responsiveness and integrity are compatible (List
2003). This escape route is of interest from a comprehensive deliberative
perspective. Proponents of that account will typically advocate not only
public decision making on reasons but also public deliberation in a
decision process. Such deliberation might transform individual judg-
ments and generate the required structural agreement among group
members (Miller 1992). There is some evidence for a mechanism along
these lines in a preference (as opposed to judgment) aggregation con-
text, but, depending on the original level of disagreement in a group,
such a mechanism will not always be operational (List, Fishkin, Luskin,
and McLean 2000).
Relaxing the responsiveness demand.—Instead of requiring that the
collective judgment on every proposition in the public agenda should
be the majority judgment on that proposition (or the result of applying
the same single-proposition decision rule), one might require that col-
lective judgments should be responsive to individual ones in this way
only for some but not all propositions and that collective judgments on
others should be derived indirectly. The premise-based procedure is an
instance of this. Here the collective judgments on the premises are the
majority judgments on these premises, but the collective judgment on
the conclusion is derived from these judgments using the appropriate
logical relation. This approach makes explicit an order of priority among
the propositions: some serve as reasons or premises for others and are
given priority in a (collective) reasoning process. This idea is generalized
in Section VIII below. Proponents of the comprehensive deliberative
account might argue that the “collectivization of reason” is captured
more adequately by this approach than by pure proposition-by-propo-
sition aggregation (Pettit 2001a; Chapman 2002). On this view, relaxing
majoritarian or systematic responsiveness is seen not as a sacrifice but
as a gain.
Appointing a dictator.—The demands of pluralism, systematic
(though not majoritarian) responsiveness, decisiveness, and integrity are
met for a nonsimple public agenda if and only if one individual is
appointed as a dictator who determines the group’s judgments (Pauly
and van Hees 2005; Dietrich and List 2005). This decision procedure
is unappealing from both minimal liberal and comprehensive deliber-
ative perspectives. It not only violates anonymity, a fundamental liberal
principle, but also abandons the idea that collective judgments should
be the result of some nondictatorial collective process.
Relaxing the decisiveness demand.—Instead of making a determinate
collective judgment on every proposition in the public agenda, the
group might abstain from making judgments on certain (controver-
sial) propositions, such as when there is not enough agreement for
or against a proposition. Specifically, the group might apply a super-
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majority or unanimity rule whereby (i) a proposition is collectively
accepted if it is accepted by a large supermajority (or all) of the in-
dividuals; (ii) its negation is collectively accepted if that negation is
accepted by a similarly large supermajority; (iii) otherwise the prop-
osition is left undecided. If the required supermajority is sufficiently
large, this decision procedure will meet all the demands introduced
above, except that of decisiveness, as many propositions will be left
undecided (List 2004; Goodin and List 2006). Compare this approach
with that of shrinking the public agenda. On the present approach,
the public agenda may remain large (particularly: nonsimple), but the
group is not required to settle all issues in that agenda. On the ap-
proach of shrinking the public agenda, the group is required to settle
all issues in the public agenda, but, to make this feasible, the agenda
is made small. The present approach is of interest from both minimal
liberal and comprehensive deliberative perspectives. Proponents of
the minimal liberal account may be attracted to the idea that collec-
tive judgments are made only if they are either practically necessary
or reducible to the unanimity (or near-unanimity) judgments of indi-
viduals. Compare Buchanan and Tullock’s unanimitarian approach
(1962) to decision making on constitutional matters. Proponents of
the comprehensive deliberative account may be attracted to the idea
that the public agenda can remain large, and perhaps include reasons,
even if not all propositions in that agenda are collectively decided.
Relaxing the integrity demand.—Finally, a way to avoid the identified
impossibility problem is to relax the integrity demand and to allow
inconsistent collective judgments. But this route seems unattractive. Pro-
ponents of the comprehensive deliberative account will be unwilling to
relax the integrity demand, as it lies at the heart of their account. Pro-
ponents of the minimal liberal account may be prepared to relax it but
do not need to, as their account largely excludes higher-order reasons
and logical relations from the public agenda, so that integrity is an
(almost) vacuous requirement.
It is now clear how the premise- and conclusion-based procedures
fit into the logical space mapped out by the demands on decision pro-
cedures introduced above. Each procedure represents one escape route
from the identified impossibility problem. The conclusion-based pro-
cedure represents the route of shrinking the public agenda and per-
mitting an “incompletely theorized” decision on the conclusion. The
premise-based procedure represents that of relaxing responsiveness so
as to allow the prioritization of some propositions over others and permit
the “collectivization of reason.” As these two routes are the preferred
ones from minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative perspectives,
respectively, the present observations reinforce my earlier claim that the
minimal liberal account suggests a conclusion-based approach to col-
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lective decision making, while the comprehensive deliberative account
suggests a premise-based one. But, as I argue below, even on the com-
prehensive deliberative account, a conclusion-based approach is some-
times preferable on epistemological grounds.
VI. THE TRUTH-TRACKING PROPERTIES OF THE PREMISE- AND
CONCLUSION-BASED PROCEDURES
How good are the premise- and conclusion-based procedures at tracking
the truth in decisions involving matters of fact?
Truth Tracking and Reliability
Consider a proposition, P, which is factually true or false, such as the
proposition that a patient has some disease. Inspired by Nozick (1981),
let me say that an agent (or decision procedure) tracks the truth on P if
two conditions hold:24 First, whenever P is true, the agent (procedure)
judges P to be true. Second, whenever P is false, it judges P to be false.
Most agents (and decision procedures) are fallible and meet these
two conditions at most approximately. To quantify an agent’s (or pro-
cedure’s) reliability at truth tracking, consider two conditional proba-
bilities, corresponding to the two conditions above: first, the conditional
probability that the agent (procedure) judges P to be true, given that
P is true; second, the conditional probability that it judges P to be false,
given that P is false. I call these two conditional probabilities the agent’s
(procedure’s) positive and negative reliability on P. Sometimes the two
probabilities are the same (symmetrical reliability), sometimes they come
apart: an agent (procedure) may be better at detecting the truth of P
than its falsehood or vice versa (asymmetrical reliability). Many medical
diagnostic tests are asymmetrical in this sense: they are better at de-
tecting the presence of some disease if the patient has the disease than
its absence if the patient does not.
An agent (or decision procedure) with a high positive and negative
reliability on P is obviously a good truth tracker on P, and one with a
low positive and negative reliability a bad one. But even an agent (pro-
cedure) with a high positive and low negative, or low positive and high
negative, reliability can be a bad truth tracker. Imagine a diagnostic test
that always produces a negative verdict, regardless of whether or not
24. To obtain Nozick’s analysis, the present two conditionals must be read as coun-
terfactual conditionals and not just as material conditionals. My simple operationalization
of truth tracking in terms of conditional probabilities is arguably weaker than Nozick’s
counterfactual analysis.
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the patient has the disease. This test has a negative reliability of 1 but
a positive reliability of 0. As a truth tracker, it is useless.25
Majority Voting and Truth Tracking on a Single Proposition
Suppose a group of individuals—a jury, for example—has to make a
collective judgment on some factual proposition, based on the group
members’ individual judgments on that proposition. What decision pro-
cedure should the group use? The Condorcet jury theorem shows that,
under mild assumptions about individual reliability, majority voting is
a remarkably good truth tracker (e.g., Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983).
Condorcet jury theorem: Suppose each group member has
a (positive and negative) reliability p greater than 0.5 on some
proposition and different individuals’ judgments are mutually in-
dependent. Then the (positive and negative) reliability of the
group’s majority judgment on that proposition approaches 1 as
the group size increases.
So if each group member has a chance greater than 0.5 of making
a correct judgment on some proposition (both when it is true and when
it is false)—call this Condorcet’s competence assumption—then the group
can make a fairly reliable judgment on that proposition just by taking
a simple majority vote, provided the number of individuals is sufficiently
large and their judgments are mutually independent.
Sometimes a group is particularly concerned with avoiding false
positive decisions (the acceptance of a false proposition) or avoiding
false negative ones (the rejection of a true proposition). In such cases,
super- or submajority voting instead of simple majority voting is optimal.
For example, supermajority voting is often used in criminal trials, to
avoid convicting the innocent. Submajority voting is sometimes used in
legislative or judicial decisions on whether to consider an initiative or
complaint, to avoid overlooking valid initiatives or complaints. But with-
out an asymmetry between false positives and false negatives, the Con-
25. This example also shows that it is not always helpful to summarize the positive
and negative reliability levels into one figure, by considering the unconditional probability
that the agent’s judgment matches the truth value of some proposition P. This uncon-
ditional probability is the sum of (i) the unconditional probability that P is true multiplied
by the conditional probability that the agent judges P to be true, given that P is true and
(ii) the unconditional probability that P is false multiplied by the conditional probability
that the agent judges P to be false, given that P is false. Bovens and Rabinowicz (2005)
use such a summary figure to measure reliability. To see that this does not always provide
a good measure of reliability, note that, even for the indiscriminate diagnostic test of the
example, the summary figure can be arbitrarily close to 1, namely, when the disease in
question is very unlikely. But the fact that (say) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is an extremely
unlikely disease does not make a test that always says “negative” a good truth tracker.
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dorcet jury theorem supports the use of simple majority voting in de-
cisions where Condorcet’s competence assumption is met.
The Case of Multiple Propositions
Suppose now a group has to decide multiple propositions, such as prem-
ises and conclusions in a conjunctive or disjunctive decision problem,
and suppose further the propositions are factual ones. Doesn’t the Con-
dorcet jury theorem simply suggest that the group should take majority
votes on all those propositions?
If all group members meet Condorcet’s competence assumption
on every proposition, this is true. But, even on an optimistic view, in-
dividuals will not generally meet this assumption on multiple intercon-
nected propositions. To see why not, suppose an individual has a (pos-
itive and negative) reliability of 0.65 on each of propositions R1 and R2
(two factual premises, say) and her judgments on R1 and R2 are mutually
independent. The probability of 0.65 is well above the threshold of 0.5
in Condorcet’s competence assumption. But now consider the same
individual’s reliability on a conclusion C that is true just in case the
conjunction is true. If R1 and R2 are both true, the individualR & R1 2
will have a probability of 0.652p 0.4225 of judging (and henceR & R1 2
C) to be true. So the individual’s positive reliability on C is below the
threshold of 0.5. Although the individual’s negative reliability on C is
still above that threshold, the individual does not meet Condorcet’s
competence assumption for the conclusion C, even though she meets
that assumption for each of the two premises R1 and R2. If all group
members are like this, then majority voting on the conclusion C is a
bad truth tracker—specifically, its positive reliability on C will approach
0 as the group size increases.
In general, individuals have different levels of reliability on different
propositions. Some propositions are harder to judge than others. For
example, it is harder to detect the truth of a conjunction than that of
each conjunct, but easier to detect its falsehood; it is easier to detect
the truth of a disjunction than that of each disjunct, but harder to detect
its falsehood. Depending on the logical and epistemological nature of
a decision problem involving multiple propositions, individuals may
have different levels of reliability across these propositions. This needs
to be taken into account when a procedure is chosen for making col-
lective judgments on those propositions.
Extending recent work by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2005), I suggest
that the premise-based procedure is a superior truth tracker for some
decision problems and the conclusion-based procedure for others (see
also List 2005). The conditions under which the premise-based procedure
outperforms the conclusion-based one are similar to those assumed by
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Bovens and Rabinowicz (although they suggest, debatably,26 that even
under these conditions the conclusion-based procedure is sometimes bet-
ter). The conditions under which the conclusion-based procedure out-
performs the premise-based one are explored here for the first time. In
my discussion, I keep the standard assumption of the Condorcet jury
theorem that the judgments of different individuals are mutually inde-
pendent (for discussions of dependencies between different individuals’
judgments, see Ladha [1992], Estlund [1994], Dietrich and List [2004a]).
Conditions under Which the Premise-Based Procedure Outperforms the
Conclusion-Based Procedure
Consider a conjunctive or disjunctive decision problem with k premises
R1, . . . , Rk and a conclusion C.
The structure of individual reliability.—Each individual has a (positive
and negative) reliability p above 0.5 and below on each premise,k0.5
and her judgments on different premises are mutually independent. So
each individual meets Condorcet’s competence assumption on each
premise but is still fallible.
An example.—In the tenure example, the committee members’ judg-
ments on the two tenure requirements might satisfy these assumptions
if we assume, first, that each committee member is reasonably, but not
very, good at judging the candidate’s teaching performance and at judg-
ing her research performance and, second (more idealistically), that
each member judges the first tenure requirement independently from
the second.
The implication for a conjunctive decision problem.—Under the premise-
based procedure, the group’s (positive and negative) reliability on the
conclusion approaches 1 with increasing group size. In the tenure ex-
ample, a large committee is likely to grant the candidate tenure if and
only if she meets the requirements. By contrast, under the conclusion-
based procedure, the group’s negative reliability approaches 1, but its
positive reliability approaches 0. Here the conclusion is likely to be
rejected in a large group, even when it is true. In the example, the
candidate is likely to be denied tenure, no matter how excellent she is.
The conclusion-based procedure is similar to a diagnostic test that (al-
most) always gives the same verdict (here the rejection of the conclu-
sion).
The implication for a disjunctive decision problem.—Under the premise-
based procedure, the group’s (positive and negative) reliability on the con-
clusion approaches 1 with increasing group size. Under the conclusion-
26. See n. 25 above. But I agree that the conclusion-based procedure is sometimes
preferable when there are certain asymmetries between false positives and false negatives,
as discussed below.
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based procedure, its positive reliability approaches 1, but its negative
reliability approaches 0. Here the conclusion is likely to be accepted in
a large group, even when it is false. For a sketch proof, see the appendix.
Conditions under Which the Conclusion-Based Procedure Outperforms the
Premise-Based Procedure
First consider a disjunctive decision problem with k premises R1, . . . ,
Rk and a conclusion C.
The structure of individual reliability.—Suppose each premise is
thought by the individuals to have a low prior probability of being true.
If all premises are false, then each individual has a probability p greater
than 0.5 of judging that they are all false. If (at least) one premise is
true, then each individual has a probability p greater than 0.5 of judging
one to be true, but it is still difficult for the individual to determine
which one it is. The individual’s probability p of judging one premise
to be true is distributed across the k premises: she has a probability p1
of judging R1 true, a probability p2 of judging R2 true, and so on, where
exceeds 0.5, but each of is less thanpp p  . . .  p p , . . . , p1 k 1 k
0.5. (One might also assume that, if Ri is the premise that is actually
true, then pi exceeds pj for any j other than i, but this assumption is not
essential.)
An example.—Again, an expert committee has to give advice on
whether there will be significant global warming. Call this proposition
C. Here C is true if and only if at least one of several possible causes
for global warming, , is in operation. The following scenarioR , . . . , R1 k
is conceivable. If there is no global warming—none of the causes is in
operation—then each scientist has a chance above 0.5 of ruling out
global warming and all of its causes. But if there is global warming—at
least one cause is in operation—then each scientist has a chance above
0.5 of judging this to be the case, but only a chance below 0.5 of iden-
tifying the correct cause. (Perhaps each scientist is still more likely to
pick the correct cause than any incorrect one, but none of these prob-
abilities exceeds 0.5.)
The implication.—Under the conclusion-based procedure, the group’s
(positive and negative) reliability on the conclusion approaches 1 with
increasing group size. In the new global warming example, a large com-
mittee is likely to track the truth on the presence or absence of global
warming. Under the premise-based procedure, the group’s negative re-
liability approaches 1, but its positive reliability approaches 0. Here the
conclusion is likely to be rejected in a large group, even when it is true.
In the example, even when there is global warming, none of the causes
is likely to be accepted by a majority of scientists, and hence the committee
is likely to advise that there will not be significant global warming. For a
sketch proof, see the appendix.
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Next consider a conjunctive decision problem with k premises
and a conclusion C.R , . . . , R1 k
The structure of individual reliability.—Suppose each premise is
thought by the individuals to have a high prior probability of being
true. If all premises are true, then each individual has a probability p
greater than 0.5 of judging that they are all true. If (at least) one premise
is false, then each individual has a probability p greater than 0.5 of
judging one to be false, but again it is difficult for the individual to
determine which one it is. The individual has a probability p1 of judging
R1 false, a probability p2 of judging R2 false, and so on, where pp
exceeds 0.5, but each of is less than 0.5.p  . . .  p p , . . . , p1 k 1 k
(One might assume that, if Ri is the premise that is actually false, then
pi exceeds pj for any j other than i, but again this assumption is not
essential.)
An example.—An expert committee (e.g., the board of a space
agency) has to give advice on whether a complex technological system
(e.g., a space shuttle) is free from a significant safety risk. This prop-
osition, C, is true if and only if the system’s multiple components all
function correctly. Here the following scenario is conceivable. If the
system is free from any significant risk—all components function cor-
rectly—then each expert may have a chance above 0.5 of judging this
to be the case. But if there is a significant risk—at least one component
is faulty—then each expert may have a chance above 0.5 of judging that
there is a risk, but only a chance below 0.5 of correctly identifying the
faulty component. (Perhaps each expert is more likely to identify the
faulty component than any other component, but none of these prob-
abilities exceeds 0.5.)
The implication.—Under the conclusion-based procedure, the group’s
(positive and negative) reliability on the conclusion approaches 1 with
increasing group size. In the risk assessment example, a large committee
is likely to track the truth on whether or not the system is free from a
significant risk. Under the premise-based procedure, the group’s negative
reliability approaches 0, but its positive reliability approaches 1. Here the
conclusion is likely to be accepted in a large group, even when it is false.
In the example, even when there is a significant risk, none of the system’s
components is likely to be identified as faulty by a majority of committee
members, and hence the committee is likely to advise that there is no
significant risk. For a sketch proof, see the appendix.
Comparing the Conditions
I have argued that, when individuals make judgments on multiple prop-
ositions, such as premises and conclusions, it is plausible that they satisfy
Condorcet’s competence assumption—a greater than 0.5 chance of
making a correct judgment—on some propositions but not on others.
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Sometimes the truth of the premises is directly discernible, while
discerning the truth of the conclusion—for example, a complex con-
junction—requires complicated inferences. In these cases, individuals
are more likely to satisfy Condorcet’s competence assumption on the
premises than on the conclusion. Other times the truth of the conclu-
sion is easier to discern than that of the premises; the conclusion might
be a broad, “coarse-grained” proposition, while the premises might be
“fine-grained” propositions about complex causal mechanisms. In those
cases, individuals are more likely to satisfy Condorcet’s competence as-
sumption on the conclusion than on the premises.
The key to choosing a decision procedure that tracks the truth on
multiple propositions lies in identifying those propositions on which
Condorcet’s competence assumption is met by the relevant individuals.
If the assumption is met on the premises but not on the conclusion,
then the premise-based procedure outperforms the conclusion-based
one at truth tracking. If it is met on the conclusion but not on the
premises, then the conclusion-based procedure outperforms the prem-
ise-based one. Even when the public agenda is defined broadly, as rec-
ommended by the comprehensive deliberative account, the premise-
based procedure is sometimes a worse truth tracker than the
conclusion-based one. Therefore even the proponents of the compre-
hensive deliberative account may sometimes opt for a conclusion-based
approach if they are concerned with truth tracking.
False Positives versus False Negatives
As noted, in some decision problems there is an asymmetry between
false positives and false negatives. In the tenure example, on an em-
ployee-friendly policy, it is worse not to grant tenure to a deserving
candidate than to grant tenure to an undeserving one; on an employer-
friendly policy, the asymmetry is reversed. In the global warming ex-
ample, it is worse from a precautionary perspective not to take action
(e.g., reduce greenhouse gas emissions) when global warming is a se-
rious threat than to take action when the threat is less serious than
feared. In the habitat example, it is worse from a conservationist per-
spective not to protect a significant habitat than to protect a less sig-
nificant one.
In a conjunctive decision problem, the conditions under which the
conclusion-based procedure accepts the conclusion are more demand-
ing than those under which the premise-based procedure does. The
conclusion-based procedure accepts the conclusion only when a majority
of individuals jointly accepts all premises, while the premise-based pro-
cedure accepts it already when separate (and possibly nonoverlapping)
majorities accept each premise without necessarily accepting the con-
clusion. So the conclusion-based procedure produces fewer false posi-
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tives than the premise-based one, but at the expense of producing more
false negatives.
In a disjunctive decision problem, the reverse is true. The condi-
tions under which the premise-based procedure accepts the conclusion
are more demanding than those under which the conclusion-based pro-
cedure does. The premise-based procedure accepts the conclusion only
when at least one premise is accepted by a majority of individuals, while
the conclusion-based procedure accepts it already when a majority of
individuals accepts the conclusion based on different premises (which
may each be accepted only by a minority). Here the premise-based
procedure produces fewer false positives than the conclusion-based pro-
cedure, but at the expense of producing more false negatives.
This suggests that, when the underlying structure of a decision
problem is conjunctive, a minimal liberal approach is less likely to pro-
duce false positive decisions, but more likely to produce false negative
ones, than a comprehensive deliberative approach; the reverse is true
when the underlying structure of a problem is disjunctive.
Based on the asymmetries in the examples above, one might there-
fore recommend a minimal liberal approach in the habitat case and a
comprehensive deliberative one in the global warming case. In the ten-
ure case, a minimal liberal approach is preferable from the perspective
of a university concerned with protecting its reputation, whereas a com-
prehensive deliberative one is preferable from the perspective of a junior
faculty member applying for tenure.
VII. THE STRATEGIC INCENTIVES GENERATED BY THE
PREMISE- AND CONCLUSION-BASED PROCEDURES
Mechanical versus Behavioral Differences of Decision Procedures
Different decision procedures are often not only mechanically different,
in that they generate different collective outputs (decisions) for the
same individual inputs (votes or judgments); they are often also behav-
iorally different, in that they lead decision makers to adjust their behavior
differently and thereby affect the inputs decision makers feed into these
procedures in the first place. This point has been documented exten-
sively in comparisons of different electoral systems (e.g., Norris 2004),
and there is every reason to think that it may also be relevant to the
issues discussed here.
In my comparison of the decision procedures suggested by the
minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts, I have so far
focused on their mechanical differences, holding all behavioral as-
sumptions fixed. Specifically, I have assumed that individuals reveal the
same individual judgments independently of whether the setting is a
minimal liberal or comprehensive deliberative one—technically, inde-















Individual 1 True True True True
Individual 2 True False True False
Individual 3 False True True False
Majority True True True False
pendently of whether the decision procedure is a premise-based or con-
clusion-based one. On the basis of technical work by Dietrich and List
(2004b), I now question these behavioral assumptions and discuss be-
havioral differences between the two approaches.
An Example
Let me revisit the tenure-committee example above, with individual
judgments as shown in table 3 (a restatement of table 1 above). When
I argued that the premise-based procedure leads to a positive tenure
decision, while the conclusion-based procedure leads to a negative one,
I assumed that, under both procedures, the individuals reveal exactly
the judgments shown in table 1; call these the individuals’ truthful judg-
ments. Is this assumption plausible?
Suppose that each committee member is convinced of his or her
own judgments and has a desire to bring about collective judgments
that coincide with those judgments. In particular, suppose, for the mo-
ment, that each committee member cares first and foremost about bring-
ing about a tenure decision that coincides with his or her own judgment
on what the tenure decision should be: so individuals 2 and 3 would
like to bring about a negative tenure decision (of which they are each
convinced), while only individual 1 would like to bring about a positive
one (of which she is equally convinced). (Below I describe this particular
motivation of the committee members as outcome-oriented and contrast
it with an alternative, reason-oriented motivation. Although the present
example assumes an outcome-oriented motivation, the more general
results on strategic manipulability and strategy-proofness below require
no such assumption.)
Now suppose that the committee uses the premise-based procedure.
If all individuals reveal their judgments truthfully, then, as shown above,
the conclusion will be accepted and the candidate will be granted ten-
ure. Individual 1 wishes to achieve this outcome, but individuals 2 and
3 would be unhappy with it. On reflection, individual 2 realizes that, if
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she falsely expresses the judgment that the candidate is not excellent
in teaching (i.e., that R1 does not hold), contrary to her truthful view,
then the majority judgment on the candidate’s teaching performance
will change from a positive to a negative one (i.e., from the acceptance
of R1 to its rejection); by implication the candidate will be denied tenure,
which is individual 2’s preferred outcome. Likewise, individual 3 realizes
that, if she falsely expresses the judgment that the candidate is not
excellent in research (i.e., that R2 does not hold), contrary to her truth-
ful view, she can change the majority judgment on the candidate’s re-
search performance and bring about a negative tenure decision, which
is individual 3’s preferred outcome. So individuals 2 and 3 each have
an incentive to strategically misrepresent their judgments, so as to bring
about an outcome they each prefer: a negative tenure decision.
By contrast, suppose the committee uses the conclusion-based pro-
cedure. If all individuals reveal their judgments truthfully—here only
judgments on the conclusion are revealed—then, as shown above, the
conclusion will be rejected and the candidate will be denied tenure.
Individuals 2 and 3 wish to achieve this outcome and have every incentive
to reveal their negative judgment on the conclusion truthfully. Individ-
ual 1 wishes to grant the candidate tenure but can do no better than
to express this judgment truthfully.
In this example, the individuals all have an incentive to reveal their
judgments truthfully under the conclusion-based procedure but not
under the premise-based one. Curiously, if the individuals all act on
their incentives here—which is what rational choice theory predicts—
then the outcome under the two procedures is exactly the same. Under
both procedures, the candidate is denied tenure, albeit via different
routes. Under the conclusion-based procedure, the outcome is brought
about through a truthful majority judgment on the conclusion itself.
Under the premise-based procedure, it is brought about through stra-
tegically manipulated majority judgments on the premises.
Strategic Manipulability and Strategy-Proofness
I have illustrated that the premise-based procedure may give individuals
an incentive to strategically misrepresent their judgments, while the
conclusion-based procedure, at least in the example, gives individuals
an incentive to reveal their judgments truthfully. This suggests that the
premise- and conclusion-based procedures may affect the behavior of
individuals differently.
I now address the incentives generated by a decision procedure
more generally. Consider any decision procedure, that is, any method
of generating collective judgments on the propositions in the public
agenda on the basis of the group members’ individual judgments. When
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does an individual have the opportunity to “manipulate” the collective
decision by strategically misrepresenting her judgments?
Manipulability.—Given a combination of individual judgments, a
decision procedure is manipulable by some individual on some propo-
sition if the following two conditions hold (Dietrich and List 2004b):
(i) if the individual reveals her judgments on all propositions truthfully,
then the collective judgment on the proposition in question differs from
the individual’s own judgment on that proposition; (ii) if the individual
strategically misrepresents her judgments on some propositions, then
the collective judgment on the proposition in question coincides with
the individual’s truthful judgment on that proposition.
For example, given the combination of individual judgments in
table 1, the premise-based procedure is manipulable by individual 2 on
proposition C and also manipulable by individual 3 on proposition C.
In each case, conditions i and ii in the definition of manipulability are
met.
Now, if an individual has the opportunity to manipulate the col-
lective judgment on some proposition (as captured by the definition of
manipulability just given) and she cares sufficiently strongly about her
own judgment on that proposition, then her opportunity to manipulate
translates into an incentive to manipulate, and she may well act on that
incentive. A decision procedure that never creates any opportunities for
strategic manipulation meets the demand of strategy-proofness (Dietrich
and List 2004b):
Strategy-proofness.—There exists no admissible combination of in-
dividual judgments for which the decision procedure is manipulable by
any individual on any proposition.
An Impossibility Result
Are there any strategy-proof decision procedures? More precisely, are
there any decision procedures that meet the demand of strategy-proof-
ness together with some of the demands introduced earlier? Clearly,
not all of the earlier demands can be imposed, as I have already shown
them to be mutually incompatible. In particular, instead of majoritarian
or systematic responsiveness, let me require only the following demand,
together with the demands of anonymity and decisiveness.
Respect for unanimity.—If all individuals unanimously judge some
proposition to be true, then the proposition is also collectively judged
to be true.
Note that this demand has no force when there is no unanimous
agreement between individuals. The following result has been proved
by Dietrich and List (2004b).
Proposition 3: For the public agenda of a conjunctive or dis-
List Discursive Dilemma 391
junctive decision problem, there exists no decision procedure that
meets the demands of pluralism, strategy-proofness, respect for
unanimity, anonymity, decisiveness, and integrity.27
Again, the result describes a trade-off between some arguably plau-
sible demands. How can this trade-off be solved? As before, each demand
can in principle be relaxed. Let me revisit the preferred escape routes
from the perspectives of the minimal liberal and comprehensive delib-
erative accounts.
Shrinking the public agenda.—If the public agenda is shrunk so as to
contain only the conclusion (or multiple unconnected propositions),
then the impossibility problem disappears. In particular, the conclusion-
based procedure is strategy-proof. As a vote is taken only on a single
proposition, namely, the conclusion, each individual’s best strategy—
the one most likely to lead to the individual’s preferred outcome—is
always to reveal her judgment on that conclusion truthfully. Apart from
shrinking the public agenda, the conclusion-based procedure meets all
other demands used in proposition 3. So the minimal liberal approach
provides a way to avoid the present impossibility problem too.
Relaxing responsiveness.—Since the responsiveness condition has al-
ready been considerably relaxed—neither majoritarian nor systematic
responsiveness is required—there is less room for any relaxations here.
One might consider relaxing respect for unanimity, although technical
work suggests that relaxing this demand alone does not open up prom-
ising possibilities.28 Again, relaxing anonymity is unattractive. Finally,
relaxing decisiveness is an option just as before, but unanimitarian or
supermajoritarian decision procedures—which are strategy-proof—have
the potential disadvantage of leaving many propositions undecided.
In summary, while the minimal liberal account has a preferred
escape route from the present impossibility problem at its disposal, the
comprehensive deliberative account does not and is therefore faced with
a serious challenge here. Ultimately, proponents of the comprehensive
deliberative account may have no choice but to relax the formal demand
of strategy-proofness itself and either accept the occurrence of strategic
manipulation—which seems undesirable from a comprehensive delib-
erative perspective—or find other ways of inducing individuals to reveal
their judgments truthfully.
As noted above, proponents of the comprehensive deliberative
account will advocate not only the publicity of reasons but also the
27. Again, assuming three or more individuals. In fact, the proposition holds for a
larger class of public agendas called “path-connected” (Dietrich and List 2004b).
28. When the public agenda contains “rich” logical interconnections, even a weaker
demand than respect for unanimity—weak responsiveness—is inconsistent with the other
demands (Dietrich and List 2004b).
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use of public deliberation in collective decisions. It has been suggested
that, when people reveal their views in public deliberation rather than
anonymous aggregation, they are less likely to act strategically. There
are at least two possible mechanisms for this, an incentive-based one
and a psychological one (Mackie 1998; Dryzek and List 2003). Ac-
cording to the incentive-based mechanism, a potential manipulator is
at greater risk of being exposed in a setting of social interaction than
in an anonymous ballot, and being exposed as a manipulator is costly,
both in terms of achieving the preferred decision outcome and in
terms of one’s reputation (Brennan and Pettit 2004). If this mecha-
nism is in operation in a public deliberative setting, then individuals
have less of an incentive to act strategically there. According to the
psychological mechanism, people adopt a more cooperative disposi-
tion when they socially interact with each other and they focus more
on the group’s perspective than on their own individual perspective.
If this mechanism is in operation in a public deliberative setting, then,
again, individuals are less likely to act strategically there, even if stra-
tegic incentives are present.
Of course, it is still an open question to what extent any such mech-
anism can be relied upon to induce individuals to reveal their judgments
truthfully. At this point, one must note a serious trade-off between the
demands that a comprehensive deliberative account seeks to impose on
a decision procedure and the demand of strategy-proofness.
The Strategic Equivalence of the Premise- and Conclusion-Based Procedures
I have noted a curious aspect of the tenure example above. If the com-
mittee members all act on their assumed incentives in that example—
some reveal truthful judgments, some strategically misrepresent their
judgments, as appropriate—then the outcome under the premise- and
conclusion-based procedures is exactly the same. This is strikingly at
odds with the standard claim—reinforced in this article—that the prem-
ise- and conclusion-based procedures may lead to different outcomes
for the same combination of individual judgments. Under what con-
ditions does that curiosity occur?
I assumed above that the committee members are each convinced
of their own judgments and have a desire to bring about collective
judgments that coincide with those judgments, but that they care pri-
marily about the final tenure decision itself. Let me introduce a general
conceptual distinction (Dietrich and List 2004b). Consider again a con-
junctive or disjunctive decision problem. An individual may not be able
to bring about collective judgments that coincide with her own judg-
ments on every proposition. If she cannot, she may care particularly
about certain propositions and less about others. The individual has
outcome-oriented preferences if her desire is first and foremost to bring about
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a collective judgment on the conclusion that coincides with her own
individual judgment on that conclusion. This was the assumption in the
tenure example. By contrast, the individual has reason-oriented preferences
if her desire is first and foremost to bring about collective judgments
on the premises that coincide with her own individual judgments on
those premises. This is perhaps the motivation that deliberative dem-
ocrats would like people to exhibit.
Given outcome-oriented preferences, as assumed in the tenure
example, it can be proved that the premise- and conclusion-based
procedures are strategically equivalent (Dietrich and List 2004b): under
the premise-based procedure, an individual with outcome-oriented
preferences has an incentive to vote for every premise if she accepts
the conclusion and against every premise otherwise. If all individuals
adopt this strategy, then the premise-based procedure always generates
the same decision on the conclusion as the conclusion-based one,
whose outcome is the result of a truthful vote on the conclusion.
Paradoxically, for outcome-oriented preferences, the mechanical dif-
ferences between the two procedures are “cancelled out” by their be-
havioral differences.
By contrast, given reason-oriented preferences, the two procedures
are not strategically equivalent. Also, given reason-oriented preferences,
individuals will not misrepresent their judgments under the premise-
based procedure, as they seek to bring about collective judgments on
the premises that coincide with their own individual judgments on those
premises. It might be speculated that a public deliberative setting is
more likely to induce reason-oriented preferences, while a minimal lib-
eral setting is more likely to induce outcome-oriented preferences. If
that speculation were correct, the mechanical differences between the
premise- and conclusion-based procedures would not be “cancelled out”
by their behavioral differences but, perhaps, rather reinforced by them;
furthermore, neither decision procedure would be faced with significant
problems of strategic manipulation. But this thought still remains a
speculation.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS: TOWARD A UNIFIED ACCOUNT
Overview
In this article, I have introduced the minimal liberal and comprehensive
deliberative accounts of collective decision making and argued that they
can be associated with two different decision procedures: the conclusion-
and premise-based ones. I have compared the two procedures in several
respects. I have investigated when and how often they disagree, assessed
them in terms of general demands on collective decision making, and
shown which demands they satisfy and which not. I have also compared
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their truth-tracking performance in decisions on factual matters and
addressed the incentives they create for decision makers. What are the
key differences between the two procedures?
The size of the public agenda.—The public agenda is usually specified
more narrowly for the conclusion-based procedure, while it is specified
more broadly for the premise-based one.
The order of priority among the propositions.—The conclusion-based
procedure prioritizes the conclusion: it forms a collective judgment
directly and only on the conclusion on the basis of the individual judg-
ments on that conclusion. The premise-based procedure prioritizes the
premises: it forms collective judgments directly on the premises on the
basis of the individual judgments on those premises; it then derives the
collective judgment on the conclusion from those collective judgments
on the premises.
The strategic incentives created by the two procedures.—The conclusion-
based procedure is strategy-proof, while the premise-based procedure
is vulnerable to the strategic misrepresentation of individual judgments.
In this final section, I revisit these key differences between the
premise- and conclusion-based procedures and suggest that they deter-
mine under what conditions one procedure is more adequate than the
other. In particular, I ask whether instead of associating the two pro-
cedures with two diametrically opposed accounts of decision making—
the minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative ones—both pro-
cedures can be embedded in a unified account in between the two ideal-
typical extremes. Although I am unable to offer such an account here,
I hope to sketch some of its likely elements.
The Size of the Public Agenda
The minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts in their
most extreme forms specify the public agenda in opposite ways: one
makes it as narrow as possible, the other as broad as possible. But the
appropriate public agenda may vary from one decision problem to an-
other, and hence the appropriate decision procedure may also vary.
What is the appropriate public agenda for a given decision problem?
For almost every decision problem, certain types of propositions,
namely, those on practical actions or policies, need to be included in
the public agenda. But sometimes it may also be appropriate to include
propositions on supporting reasons or other background consider-
ations. As noted above, a Rawlsian criterion for the inclusion of such
propositions might be whether they are “political” rather than “meta-
physical” ones: propositions capable of being supported by an overlap-
ping consensus within the relevant group as opposed to ones on which
there is irresolvable disagreement based on different worldviews. When
a wide range of people endorse certain reasons—even if they endorse
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them on the basis of different worldviews—then the public resolution
of these reasons may enhance the legitimacy and stability of a decision.
However, when reasons are controversial and divisive, their public res-
olution may have the opposite effect.
Should factual propositions always be included in the public
agenda? If a proposition is clearly factual and its resolution poses no
great difficulties, then the answer is probably positive. But whether a
proposition is factual may itself be controversial. While some proposi-
tions may be unambiguously factual, others are considered factual by
some people and value laden or nonfactual by others. In the global
warming example, all propositions are factual ones; the first premise
concerns a contingent fact about the state of the world, the second a
general physical mechanism; still, some critics might describe these
propositions as value laden. In the tenure example, the propositions
about the candidate’s performance in research and teaching both in-
volve a complex combination of facts and values. In the habitat pro-
tection example, the status of the premises is unclear; there may be
substantial disagreement on whether they are factual or not.
On many kinds of propositions—such as ethical or aesthetic
ones—we can distinguish between cognitivist and noncognitivist views.
Cognitivists ascribe truth values to these propositions, while noncog-
nitivists interpret them as expressions of attitudes or sentiments. Dis-
agreements between cognitivists and noncognitivists may affect not
only the question of where to draw the line between factual and non-
factual propositions but also the question of what propositions to in-
clude in the public agenda. Those who hold a cognitivist view on a
larger class of propositions may endorse a larger public agenda; those
who hold a noncognitivist view on a larger class of propositions may
endorse a smaller one.
Finally, even when people agree that a proposition is factual, they
may still be so divided over that proposition’s truth value that it is
better to exclude the proposition from the public agenda. Consider,
for example, a proposition about the existence of God. Many theists
and atheists share the belief that this proposition is factual, yet they
are deeply divided over its truth value. I conclude that an important
element of a unified account of collective decision making will be a
set of criteria that size the public agenda differently for different de-
cision problems.
The Order of Priority among the Propositions
As noted above, the conclusion- and premised-based procedures—in
line with the minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative accounts—
prioritize the propositions differently. The order of priority among the
propositions matters in at least two respects.
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First, it determines whether or not the reasoning process over the
propositions—the drawing of logical inferences—is “collectivized” and,
if it is, what the precise structure of that reasoning process is. Different
decision problems may require a different collective reasoning process
(if any) and therefore a different decision procedure.
Second, the order of priority among the propositions may affect a
decision procedure’s capacity to track the truth on the propositions. A
well-chosen order of priority—such as one that gives priority to prop-
ositions for which Condorcet’s competence assumption is met by the
decision makers—can improve that capacity. The order of priority may
also affect the relative likelihood of false positive and false negative
decisions and may thus be relevant to the particular asymmetry between
false positives and false negatives in a given decision problem. As the
“epistemically appropriate” order of priority may vary from one decision
problem to another, the appropriate decision procedure may also vary.
A key element of a unified account of collective decision making
will therefore be not only a set of criteria for identifying the appropriate
order of priority among the propositions for a given decision problem
but also a method for making decisions based on that order. A decision
procedure along these lines can be stated as follows.
A sequential priority decision procedure.—First, an order of priority
among the propositions in the public agenda is specified. Earlier prop-
ositions are interpreted as “prior to” later ones, capable of serving as
reasons for or against later ones. Second, the group considers the prop-
ositions in that order. For each proposition under consideration, if the
proposition is unconstrained by propositions considered earlier, then
the group decides the new proposition by majority voting (or some
other single-proposition decision rule); but if it is constrained by prop-
ositions considered earlier (such as a conclusion constrained by earlier
premises), then the group derives its judgment on the new proposition
from its judgments on those earlier propositions (List 2004).
The premise- and conclusion-based procedures are both special
cases of a sequential priority decision procedure, albeit for a different
specification of the public agenda. The conclusion-based procedure is
a sequential priority procedure applied to a simple public agenda con-
taining only the conclusion, where that conclusion is (trivially) priori-
tized. The premise-based procedure is a sequential priority procedure
applied to a nonsimple public agenda of a conjunctive or disjunctive
decision problem, where the premises and the appropriate logical re-
lation are given priority over the conclusion. A unified account that
allows a flexible specification of both the public agenda and the order
of priority among the propositions may therefore adequately cover both
decision problems in which a premise-based approach is more adequate
and ones in which a conclusion-based approach is more adequate.
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TABLE 4
Table 2 (Restated)
R1 R2 R3 C ↔ (R1 or R2 or R3) C
Individual 1 True False False True True
Individual 2 False True False True True
Individual 3 False False True True True
Majority False False False True True
The Strategic Incentives Created by the Two Procedures
In recommending what decision procedure to use for a given decision
problem, a unified account of decision making should also take into
account whether any mechanisms are in place for inducing decision
makers to reveal their judgments truthfully. These mechanisms might
be incentive-based or psychological, as discussed above, and different
contexts may require different such mechanisms. Clearly, more research
is required here.
The Noninvariance of Collective Decisions under Changes in the Public
Agenda and under Changes in the Order of Priority among the Propositions
Finally, let me observe an important property that a unified account of
collective decision making will exhibit: for the same underlying structure
of individual judgments, the collective judgments generated by an ap-
propriate decision procedure will not generally be invariant under
changes in the public agenda and under changes in the order of priority
among the propositions. To illustrate this point, consider three different
decision problems with the same underlying structure of individual judg-
ments as shown in table 4 (a restatement of table 2 above).
The first decision problem is the habitat protection case, as dis-
cussed above. The second is the case of a three-member court that has
to reach a verdict in a criminal case. The defendant might have com-
mitted one of three different crimes (R1, R2, or R3). Each judge thinks
that the defendant is guilty of one crime and, hence, that he should go
to prison (C), but the judges disagree on which crime it is. Nonetheless,
the judges unanimously agree that the defendant should go to prison.
The third problem is that of another three-member court that has to
decide whether to repeat a trial (C) (Pettit 2001a). The trial should be
repeated if and only if at least one of three procedural flaws has oc-
curred: some of the evidence was inadmissible (R1), the confession was
forced (R2), or some other rule of due process was violated (R3). All
judges think that the trial was procedurally flawed and that it should
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be repeated, although they disagree on how exactly it was flawed. How
might a unified account address these three decision problems?
The public agenda.—In the habitat case, as argued above, there may
be good reasons for excluding the premises from the public agenda
and including in it only the conclusion. In the prison sentence case,
there is every reason for including all the premises and the conclusion
in the public agenda, as the court needs to provide a legal justification
for its verdict. In the retrial case, again there seem to be good (though
perhaps slightly weaker) reasons for including all the premises and the
conclusion in the public agenda.
The order of priority among the propositions.—Again, as suggested above,
in the habitat case, it may be appropriate to prioritize the conclusion.
In the prison sentence case, there seem to be strong reasons for pri-
oritizing the premises, first, because they serve as the normatively sig-
nificant reasons and, second, because this reduces the risk of a false
positive decision—which should be reduced to protect the defendant.
In the retrial case, the order of priority is less clear. But there may be
good reasons for prioritizing the conclusion rather than the premises
in this case, as this reduces the risk of a false negative decision—which
should be reduced here to protect the defendant.
If the public agenda and the order of priority are specified as
I have suggested, then a sequential priority decision procedure, ap-
plied to each case, will implement a conclusion-based approach in the
habitat case, a premise-based one in the prison sentence case, and a
conclusion-based one in the retrial case. So, for the same structure of
individual judgments, the outcome is the acceptance of the conclusion
in the habitat and retrial cases, and its rejection in the prison sentence
case. But even in the habitat and retrial cases the conclusion is accepted
through a different route. In the habitat case, it is accepted because
the public agenda contains only the conclusion, which is thereby au-
tomatically prioritized. In the retrial case, it is accepted because, al-
though the premises are also contained in the public agenda, the con-
clusion is prioritized so as to avoid a false negative decision.
In conclusion, the present considerations show that the structure
of individual judgments underdetermines the appropriate decision at
the collective level. An adequate decision procedure will neither aggre-
gate these judgments mechanically nor systematically prioritize either
the premises or the conclusion. Rather, its decision will depend on the
nature of the public agenda and on the appropriate order of priority
among the propositions. In short, its decision will depend on the sphere
of public reason appropriate for the decision problem in question. Often
the question of what that sphere of public reason is will itself be under
debate. But I hope to have shown that an answer to this question is
important for a resolution of the discursive dilemma.
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Appendix
Tables for the Sketch Proof of Proposition 1
TABLE A1
An Odd Number of Individuals , Wherenp 3 2m m ≥ 0
R1 R2 C ↔ (R1 & R2) C
Individual 1 True True True True
Individual 2 True False True False
Individual 3 False True True False
Individuals 4, . . . , 3  m True False True False
Individuals 3  m 1, . . . , 3  2m False True True False
Majority True True True False
TABLE A2
An Even Number of Individuals , Wherenp 6 2m m ≥ 0
R1 R2 C ↔ (R1 & R2) C
Individuals 1, 2 True True True True
Individuals 3, 4 True False True False
Individuals 5, 6 False True True False
Individuals 7, . . . , 6  m True False True False
Individuals 6  m  1, . . . , 6  2m False True True False
Majority True True True False
Tables A1 and A2 can be modified for a public agenda containing only
R1, R2, , and their negations. For that agenda, delete the rowR & R1 2
corresponding to from tables A1 and A2 and replaceC ↔ (R & R )1 2
proposition C with . Tables A1 and A2 can also easily be modifiedR & R1 2
for a disjunctive decision problem or a public agenda containing only
R1, R2, R1 or R2 (or only R1, R2, ), and their negations.R r R1 2
TABLE A3
np 4
R1 R2 C ↔ (R1 & R2) C
Individual 1 True True True True
Individual 2 True False True False
Individual 3 False True True False
Individual 4 True True False False
Majority True True True False
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Table A3 can be modified for a disjunctive decision problem but
not for a public agenda containing only R1, R2, (or ,R & R R r R1 2 1 2
or R1 or R2), and their negations. To obtain an impossibility result for
that agenda, the integrity demand must be slightly strengthened, so as
to impose a deductive closure demand. Finally, modifications of all tables
for more than two premises are also straightforward.
Sketch Proof of the Results on the Conditions under Which the
Premise-Based Procedure Outperforms the Conclusion-Based
Procedure
I sketch a proof for a conjunctive decision problem; the proof for a
disjunctive decision problem is analogous. First consider the premise-
based procedure. Each individual satisfies Condorcet’s competence as-
sumption for each premise Ri, so the group’s (positive and negative)
reliability on each of R1, . . . , Rk approaches 1 with increasing group
size. Therefore, the probability that all of R1, . . . , Rk are correctly
decided by a majority—the product of the group’s reliability levels on
R1, . . . , Rk—also approaches 1, and the probability of a correct decision
on the conclusion C under the premise-based procedure approaches 1,
regardless of whether C is true or false. Further, the correct decision
on C is likely to be made “for the right reasons” (Bovens and Rabinowicz
2005), as all of R1, . . . , Rk are likely to be judged correctly by a majority.
Next consider the conclusion-based procedure. Each individual judges
the conjunction (and hence C) to be true only if heR & . . . & R1 k
or she judges all of R1, . . . , Rk to be true. If all of R1, . . . , Rk (and
C) are true, then each individual has a probability p of judging each Ri
to be true, and hence a probability pk of judging (andR & . . . & R1 k
C) to be true. As p is between 0.5 and , it follows that pk is belowk0.5
0.5. By the reverse of Condorcet’s jury theorem, the probability that C
is judged to be true by a majority approaches 0 with increasing group
size; so the positive reliability of the group decision on C under the
conclusion-based procedure approaches 0. If at least one of R1, . . . ,
Rk (and thus C) is false, then each individual has a probability greater
than 0.5 of judging at least one of R1, . . . , Rk (and thus C) to be false.
So the probability that C is judged to be false by a majority approaches
1 with increasing group size; so the negative reliability of the group
decision on C under the conclusion-based procedure approaches 1.
Sketch Proof of the Results on the Conditions under Which the
Conclusion-Based Procedure Outperforms the Premise-Based
Procedure
I sketch a proof for a disjunctive decision problem; the proof for a
conjunctive decision problem is analogous. First consider the conclu-
sion-based procedure. If the disjunction R1 or . . . or Rk (and hence
C) is false, then each individual has a probability p greater than 0.5 of
judging that disjunction (and C) to be false. If the disjunction R1 or
. . . or Rk (and hence C) is true, then each individual has a probability
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p greater than 0.5 of judging it (and C) to be true. So each individual
satisfies Condorcet’s competence assumption for the conclusion, and
hence the group’s (positive and negative) reliability on C approaches
1 with increasing group size. Next consider the premise-based proce-
dure. If the disjunction R1 or . . . or Rk (and hence C) is false, then
each individual has a probability p greater than 0.5 of judging each of
R1, . . . , Rk to be false, and so the probability that each premise and
hence the conclusion will be rejected under the premise-based proce-
dure approaches 1 with increasing group size; thus the negative reli-
ability of the group decision on C under the premise-based procedure
approaches 1. But if the disjunction R1 or . . . or Rk (and hence C) is
true, then each individual’s probability pi of judging each Ri to be true
is still below 0.5. So the probability that each premise and hence the
conclusion will still be rejected under the premise-based procedure ap-
proaches 1 with increasing group size; thus the positive reliability of the
group decision on C under the premise-based procedure approaches
0. The fact that the “correct” premise Ri might receive a larger minority
than any other premise does not help. Regardless of whether C is true
or false, the probability that the premise-based procedure leads to the
rejection of C approaches 1 with increasing group size.
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